Abstract. The existing computer and modern communication technologies cannot meet the needs of network security of Cyberspace. Based on the differential game theory, in this paper, a non-cooperative differential game model is presented for Cyberspace security issues. It would effectively detect the attack by malicious nodes with a minimum of resources. The simulation experiment results show that this model has good performance on probability stability and time efficiency, meanwhile, it could ensure the minimal resource consumption.
Recently, game theory has been used extensively to model and analyze network security issues. It has been provided can solve security issue for wireless networks against internal attacks [3, 4] . Actually, game theory provides a formal analytical and mathematical framework to model rational decision making or strategies of multiple players having different objectives interacting with each other. According to Cyberspace structure, using differential game theory, we have established a non-cooperative differential Game Model for Cyberspace Security. The security model consists of three parts, which is as shown in Table 1 .
Behavior of Player in Differential Game Model for Cyberspace Security
Players refer to the set of all the nodes in Cyberspace network. According to the different purpose of the network transmission, players in Cyberspace can be divided into two categories: defense nodes D i P and malicious nodes A j P . The first kind nodes are always trying to exploit minimal resources, while they would successfully send information against malicious nodes attack, in order to to get the maximum benefit. On the other hand, the malicious nodes attempt to exploit minimal resources to maximize damage or attack other normal nodes in Cyberspace network. Since we pay more attention to the safety performance of the defense nodes, this article will explain in detail on the defense nodes, the malicious nodes are similar with the defense ones.
In the information transfer, the behavior of player can be expressed 
t is defined as the number of packets which 
Gain and Differential Game Model for Cyberspace Security
Since the communication nodes in Cyberspace are rational, defense node Gain is defined as follows:
Gain
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So, we have:
Gain q p t num t gain u t r T t ds r T t U p T
where: 0 r > is discount factor, its value is affected by factor r at time t . , the probability of detecting a malicious node is 100%. However, this will also bring a lot of unnecessary resource consumption. Therefore, defense nodes need to properly reduce the intensity of the defense strategy so as to save their resources.
( ) p t ε , the probability of discovery of malicious nodes, could be expressed in a dynamic way as follows:
dp t u t p t u t p t ds
where
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T t − is temporal interval. For defense nodes, its goal is to obtain the maximum value of
Gain .
The Calculation of Optimal Strategy
Constraint Condition of Feedback Nash
In this section, for equation (4), (5), we would get its optimal solution. Since each defense node and malicious node do not make a pre-agreement, there is a feedback Nash equilibrium solution. 
is a feedback Nash equilibrium strategy of ( )
, which satisfy the Bellman-Isaacs equation [5] .
Feedback Nash Equilibrium of Defense Node
For the defense node
, inspired by [6, 7] , a feedback Nash equilibrium solution to equation (1), (2) can be described as follows: 
By equation (6), a maximum of defense node feedback Nash equilibrium solution is: We assume that defense nodes are 1000, and malicious nodes are 4 in the Cyberspace. As shown in figure 2, According to the optimal strategy When we assume malicious nodes are added to 70, although finding malicious nodes still quickly reach steady state, we would know they spent more time than a small number of malicious nodes. As shown in figure 3. Simulation results show that setting up non-cooperative differential game model for Cyberspace security has good stability and high efficiency when people discover malicious nodes on the time and probability.
Conclusion
For the Cyberspace node security problem, based on the differential game theory, we set up a non-cooperative differential game model. The defense nodes can detect the attacks of malicious nodes in a fastest way with minimal resource consumption, thus ensuring the security transmission of communication. How to combine this model and Cyberspace ideally will be our next research direction.
